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abstract There is a tendency among social scientists and others to interpret the
recent war and the related ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of a poli-
tical policy carefully orchestrated from above and systematically carried out. Whatever
eruptions of (war)violence might deviate from this interpretation are generally viewed
as primitive Balkanism, pointless acts, banditism or mental aberrations. Adopting a
long-term historical perspective, this article describes a violence process whose final
result can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of a local community, but its dynamics
cannot directly be attributed to a policy implemented from above. Rather its course
can largely be traced back to clan vendettas and local faction fighting in the context
of an emerging pilgrimage regime. The case illustrates that a systematic study ‘from
below’ is crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and the developmental
logic of the processes of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in this part of ex-Yugoslavia.
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O n the early  morning of 27  May 1 992 , Ljerka ivri  saw somethinghorrible in the neighbouring yard of her father’s brother Djure. Threehuman bodies, their feet tied to a pipe and the hands behind their
backs, were suspended upside down, immersed up to the shoulders in the
partially demolished cistern. Djure and his two adult sons Ante and Djure
had been savagely slain. Two weeks earlier, on the night of 1 0 May, a similar
drama had unfolded in Siro Ostoji ’s yard. Someone found Siro’s elderly par-
ents there, hanging from the mulberry  tree in front of their house, their throats
slit and their hands chopped off.
These are only  two of the long list of atrocities that have dominated life in
Medjugorje ever since the autumn of 1 991 . Since 1 981 , Medjugorje, situated
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in the southwestern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been a Marian pilgrim-
age centre with an international reputation. But before they knew it, the vil-
lagers found themselves caught up in a vicious process of violence. At first it
was only  their property  they were in danger of losing, but soon it was their
lives as well. In early  July 1 992, when the Croatian army imposed peace upon
the western part of Herzegovina, local violence came to an end. But Medju-
gorje’s mali rat (little war), as the villagers called it, had taken its toll.1  Of the
approximately 3 ,000 villagers, an estimated 1 40 had been killed, 60 were missing
and approximately 600 had fled, and a number of buildings had been totally
or partially  destroyed.2
These were the sad effects of a violence process which had ravaged Med-
jugorje like a tornado and had resulted in an ethnic homogenization of the
popular pilgrimage centre.
There is a tendency among social scientists, historians, politicians, jour-
nalists, and other Balkan specialists to interpret the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as the result of a political policy carefully orchestrated from above
and systematically  carried out. Whatever eruptions of war violence might
deviate from this interpretation are generally  viewed as primitive Balkanism,
pointless and absurd violence, the acts of bandits, organized crime, or mental
aberrations (e.g. Bali  1 992 ; Denitch 1 994; Donia and Fine 1 994; Malcolm
1 994; Cigar 1 995 , 1 996; Geiss and Intermann 1 995 ; Sorabji 1 995 ; Me trovi
1 996; Sells 1 996; Silber and Little 1 996; West 1 996). Terms of this kind re-
flect an uncritical acceptance of a central or national leader perspective, dis-
missing as deviant everything that does not go according to plan and deny-
ing or downplaying the significance of specific local and regional circum-
stances.
In the following pages, a violence process will be described whose final
result can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of the Medjugorje commu-
nity, but its dynamics cannot directly  be attributed to a policy  implemented
from above. Rather, its course can largely be traced back to clan vendettas
and local faction fighting in the context of an emerging pilgrimage regime.
The case illustrates that a systematic study ‘from below’ is crucial to a better
understanding of the dynamics and the developmental logic of processes of
ethnic cleansing in this part of ex-Yugoslavia. Only then is it possible to com-
prehend the so-called absurdities and incongruities and transcend the dicho-
tomy prevalent in the public debate on ‘the cause of the war’, i.e. a spontane-
ous manifestation of primitive Balkanism versus mass destruction carefully
prepared and planned and carried out from above.
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Historical Background: Endemic Enmity and Antagonism
‘Here the knife does not go blunt and the (rifle) barrel does not rust’, or so
an old man concluded his historical view of the region. The recent atrocities
of Medjugorje’s little war did not surprise him, for they were part of a long
history  of warfare and revenge.
To a certain extent, the long history that the old man was referring to has
to do with geo-political circumstances. Until the early  decades of the 20th
century, large parts of ex-Yugoslavia were virtually without interruption bor-
der regions disputed by  powerful kingdoms and other political power blocs.3
For almost five hundred years, far into the nineteenth century , ex-Yugoslavia
was a pawn in the power game between the Austrians and Hungarians to the
northwest and the Ottomans to the southeast. Then it was torn between the
Italians and Germans on the Axis side and the Russians and the Allies on the
other. And after World War ii, up until the end of the Cold War, the capitalist
West and the communist East drove a deep wedge into Yugoslav society (cf.
Alexander 1 979; Jelavich 1 990). These powers not only  severely impeded the
development of a stable state with an effective central control over the means
of physical violence, they also created the conditions for the growth of nationa-
lism and ethnic antagonism (Bana  1 984 ; Cole 1 981 ; A. Djilas 1 985 , 1 991 ;
Ramet 1 985 ; imi  1 991 ; Malcolm 1 994; Denitch 1 996).
In the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the central part of ex-Yugosla-
via, these developments can be traced w ith the greatest clarity. More than
four hundred years of warfare between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empire
made the region an ethnic hotchpotch. Large groups of Serbs from the south-
east fled to the Bosnian countryside, settling mainly  in the less fertile parts of
the region (Krajina). Population pressure and a sense of adventure led Croats,
mainly from the bleak Dalmatian Mountains, to move southeastward. Large
numbers of people eager to take advantage of any opportunity to ‘get ahead’
converted to Islam, thus laying the foundation for the third ethnic group, the
Muslims (Koljevi  1 980; A. Djilas 1 991 ; Bringa 1 995 ; Donia and Fine 1 997 ).4
During this same period, and in part as a reaction to the frequently  harsh
Ottoman regime, a tradition of small-scale violent resistance developed in
Herzegovina: guerrilla bands of hadju i, usta i and etni i.5  Clusters of these
resistance groups made it difficult to permanently pacify  the area, and their
rivalry  promoted acts of revenge and retaliation within and among the vari-
ous villages (Jelavich 1 990; Koljevi  1 980; Dedijer 1 974 ; Soldo 1 964; Vego
1 981 ). Owing to their strategic position vis-à-vis the population, only  Ro-
man Catholic clergymen could temporarily  curb the violence (Bax 1 995 ).6
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The fall of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in 1 91 2  and 1 91 8  did not
put an end to these forms of small-scale violence or stop people from taking
the law  into their own hands. On the contrary , ever since the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1 929)
was founded in 1 91 8 , they constituted an integral component — overtly  or
covertly — of the interaction between the most important groups, the Serbs
and the Croats (Bana  1 984; Ramet 1 985 ).
A current (though not undisputed) opinion is that Serb and Croat national
consciousness goes back to the Middle Ages. At the time, each of the groups
was a separate kingdom, parts of which are now disputed territory  ( imi
1 991 ). Foreign rule put an end to their political independence, but religious
beliefs (the Serbian Orthodox Church for the Serbs and Catholicism for the
Croats) have always remained important identification and distinguishing
factors (Ramet 1 984 ; Rathfelder 1 992 ; Rusinow 1 982).
When the Serbs and Croats united to form one independent kingdom, these
old distinctions were transformed into rapidly escalating ethnic differences
that soon dominated virtually  the entire political arena. Each of the parties
was convinced that the other was after hegemonic control. Certainly  at the
beginning, the Croats had the most grounds for apprehension. The king of
the empire was a Serb, the Serbs were by far the largest group, and they held
almost all the important positions in the government, the bureaucracy, the
army and the police force and every  chance they got, they gave their fellow
Serbs preferential treatment (A. Djilas 1 991 ; Soldo n.d.). This intensified na-
tionalist feelings, and particularly  in the ethnically  mixed areas, with Bosnia-
Herzegovina at the top of the list, tension ran high. The Serb domination
there was characterized by brutal injustice to the Croats, whose political leaders
and their local representatives were removed from office and imprisoned.
The Croats in turn organized armed gangs called Ustasi, who kidnapped Serb
leaders and were not unlikely to murder them as well. Neither of the parties
had much patience with traitors (Bana  1 984; Jeli -Buti  1 983 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ;
opi  1 963 ; Kri man 1 980, 1 983 ; Star evi  1 941 ). Soon this ethnically  mixed
area, with borders sometimes running through the middle of villages, turned
into a ‘complex of snake pits joint together by murder, manslaughter, de-
struction and betrayal’ (Soldo 1 964).
When the tension spread to other regions and the country  became ungov-
ernable, the king disbanded the parliament and instigated a veritable reign of
terror. Every trace of opposition was harshly suppressed by  gangs of etni i,
a loosely organized auxiliary  division of the national police, consisting of Serbs
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who roamed through the Croat areas, robbing and plundering along the way.
Their horrendous conduct, which I have described elsewhere (Bax 1 993 ),
provoked similar behaviour on the part of the Croats, particularly the Croats
of South and West Herzegovina. In this inhospitable region with its coarse
and truculent inhabitants, the Usta a groups burgeoned.7  In tiny guerrilla units,
they terrorized the Serb communities (Kri man 1 980; Jeli -Buti  1 986; Toma-
sevich 1 975 ).
The Second World War deepened the chasm of hatred and magnified the
violence to almost unprecedented proportions. With the backing of the Axis
Powers, the Independent State of Croatia was founded, and Bosnia-Herzegovina
was part of it. With the help of the extremely vicious and pugnacious Usta a
organization, the new state made every effort to cleanse Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina of all the Serb elements. The Serbs in these regions sought the
help and support of the etni i, who had gone underground en masse after the
German demobilization of the Yugoslav army. Bosnia-Herzegovina turned into
one huge battlefield, where guerrillas not only attacked each other, but even
more so each other’s towns and the civilians residing there, enormous num-
bers of whom they assaulted, mutilated and murdered in the most atrocious
ways ( opi  1 963 ; Anonymous 1 986; Jeli  1 978 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ; M. Djilas 1 980).
During this period, the Usta a stronghold Medjugorje lost almost half its
population. The village also suffered huge material damage, for almost all
the cattle were slaughtered or stolen and many of the homes were destroyed,
as were the crops in the fields (Bax 1 991 ).
A third, perhaps even more cruel party  soon joined the war, the Partizans
led by Tito. With his dreaded and later renowned guerrilla troops, this Com-
munist leader was soon victorious, thanks in part to his incorporation of the
etni i, who were being defeated at the time. In 1 943 , aided by  the Allies and
the Russians, he founded a new Yugoslav state on Bosnian territory (Parin
1 991 ; M. Djilas 1 980, 1 983 ).
A modern political, executive and legislative system was built up under
Tito, putting a formal end to the ethnic violence and personal feuds. Brother-
hood and Unity  was the motto of the new order focused on total economic
and social modernization along socialist lines. For years, an extremely effective
system of repression enabled the authorities to present this fiction to the outside
world as reality. Although there was a decline in the open hostilities, behind
the communist front the old enmity  and antagonism lived on undiminished.
Southwestern Herzegovina, the regional focus of this article, may have
been cleansed of its numerous Usta i, but their relatives were still treated as
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second-class citizens. They were barred from the ruling Communist Party
and thus could not obtain state benefits and civil service jobs. In all the public
sectors, the Serbs in the region were in control. As ex-Partizans or their off-
spring, they dominated the Communist Party, the public administration, the
police, the army, the bureaucracy and the numerous modern government
enterprises (Vego 1 981 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ). In order to achieve their aims, the
Serbs in the region used legal means and methods; the Croats had little choice
but to resort to the old forms of self-help. In the formal, legal and political
discourse, there were no Croats, there were only  ‘criminals’, ‘subversive ele-
ments’ and ‘reactionary forces’. In the hidden discourse of the dominated Croats,
however, the opponents were referred to as Srbi or etni i. Thus formal rules
covertly  contributed toward the systematic exclusion of the Croat opponent
— an ethnic cleansing of a sort (M. Djilas 1 977 , 1 983 ).8
The veneer of the ‘new order’ gradually  began to wear thin. Driven by cir-
cumstances, in the early  seventies groups of armed young men who called
themselves Usta i began to gather in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their targets
were government institutions, the region’s numerous arms depots, party  offi-
cials, and villages dominated by  Serbs (Hofwiler 1 992 ; Gelhard 1 992 ; Soldo
n.d.).9
In Medjugorje as well, an Usta a cell assembled which, according to my
informants, was incorporated in the late seventies into a regional network
consisting of several thousand men. In essence this ‘organized crime that has
spread from the capitalist West’, as the regional authorities referred to it, was
a reaction to the fact that the Croats had no rights. The response was not
long in coming. Particularly  in the smaller towns and villages, where the pre-
sence of the official authorities was not so keenly felt, vigilantes gathered,
whom their opponents referred to as etni i. Groups of Usta i seemed to be
playing a cat and mouse game with these etni i, who were sometimes as-
sisted by  the official authorities (Soldo n.d.).
Once again thunderclouds of violence began to gather in the region, but
this time there was a countervailing trend of a totally  different kind. Its locus
was Medjugorje, a humble peasant village in a part of Herzegovina so arid
and bleak that only  snakes, stones and Usta i could thrive there, or so the
saying goes.10  In 1 981 , that tiny village became the centre of a Marian devo-
tional movement focused on peace which rapidly assumed international pro-
portions (Bax 1 989, 1 990, 1 995 ).
The pacifying influence this pilgrimage centre exerted for almost a dec-
ade can be briefly  summarized as follows.11  The mass influx of more than
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seventeen million pilgrims from all over the world imposed peace-oriented
standards of conduct upon the people of the village and the entire vicinity.
During this period there was a spectacular decline throughout the region in
the number of registered crimes, feuds and other forms of violent self-help
(see Bax 1 991 ). The inhabitants of Medjugorje, the entire region, and indeed
the regional authorities benefited from the economic boom resulting from
the religious tourism.12
The Fall of a Pilgrimage Regime
Almost all the villagers renovated their homes to be better able to accom-
modate more pilgrims, enlarging their capital and taking out new loans all
the while. Times were good for all of them, although of course they were
better for some than for others.
The Ostoji i fared by  far the best, everyone agreed about that. It had once
been a poor clan w ith very little land, most of which was barren because of
its location at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross. This was why so many
of the Ostoji i had regularly  lived and worked abroad, mainly in Germany,
the United States and Canada. According to the local population, this had
made them a bit stran (different, strange).13
The more signs Medjugorje showed of turning into a flourishing pilgrim-
age centre, the more Ostoji  people returned to their native village. With the
capital they earned, they soon rose to occupy a dominant position in the reli-
gious tourist industry. They built the only  two ‘real’ hotels in the village, and
in a neighbouring hamlet a large bungalow complex for pilgrims, complete
with a small chapel. Most of the taxi licences were registered in their name,
and at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross, the holiest shrine of all and fre-
quented by  virtually  all the pilgrims, they set up a number of restaurants, out-
door cafés and souvenir shops. They had a monopoly over almost all the bread
and alcohol supplied to the village, and ran the most important local branches
of national travel agencies. Their influence was not limited to the immediate
vicinity. At the most important arrival sites, the airports at Mostar, Split, Dubrov-
nik and Zagreb, Ostoji i agents picked up the pilgrims in Ostoji i coaches
and brought them to accommodations owned by  the Ostoji i clan. All these
facilities would not have been feasible w ithout an extensive network of con-
nections in the bureaucracies of the district and national government.
Of course this super-entrepreneuring gave rise to jealousy. In particular
the Jerkovi i and ivri i, the oldest and most respected clans, felt humiliated
by those ‘stone eaters’, as they called the Ostoji i, whose land was indeed
3 2 4
ethnos, vol. 65 :3 , 2 000 (pp . 3 1 7 –3 40)
mart bax
strewn with stones. They themselves had the best land, and there they grew
grapes and tobacco. From Vienna to Istanbul, their produce had been re-
nowned for centuries. They looked down on the Ostoji i because they were
so dependent on biro cetni i, as they called the Serb government officials. A
good Croat — and the population of Medjugorje, including the nearby ham-
lets, consisted of Croats — was independent and took care of business with-
out needing any help. That was the rule they lived by , though they did on
occasion have to pay a bribe or two themselves (cf. Bax 1 993 ).
As long as everyone was able to profit from the expanding pilgrimage econ-
omy, the outbursts of jealousy remained small. But when the impending vio-
lence of war gradually cut off this lifeline, matters clearly changed. This started
in the latter part of the summer of 1 990. Due to terrorist activities of Serbs
and Montenegrins, the southern Croatian coastal regions were unsafe and
difficult to reach, which meant a sharp fall in the number of pilgrims. Croatia’s
declaration of  independence in December that year only  served to intensify
this trend. And by the early  spring of 1 991 , when Croatia and the federal
troops were engaged in open warfare, most of the boarding houses in Medju-
gorje had barely had a pay ing guest for some time. Thanks to bribes and good
connections, only  the ones owned by  the Ostoji i were still partly  occupied.
Virtually  all the villagers had gone deeply into debt, and when they were hit
by hard times, they could no longer tolerate the ‘inequality ’ of this situation.
Leaders of other clans began to negotiate with the Ostoji i about dividing
‘what little there was’. The negotiations, it is said, did not proceed smoothly.
On the contrary , a lot of old resentment surfaced, and in the end the Ostoji i
refused to share their favourable entrepreneuring position with anyone. The
story goes that the parties did not part in friendship, and in fact Medjugorje’s
‘little war’ was already looming.
On 1 5  August 1 991 , the Feast of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin, two
groups faced each other at the access road to the Mountain of the Cross. A
few dozen armed and masked men kept a good three hundred pilgrims, guests
of the Ostoji i, from carrying out their plan to climb the Mountain of the
Cross in prayer. The pilgrims – this author was among them – were ordered
to leave, which they did after several warning shots were fired in the air. Later
that day, accompanied by  several Ostoji i and a local clergyman, they made
a second effort. Again it was in vain. Following the advice of the priest, the
pilgrims abandoned their efforts. But this was not the end of it for the Ostoji i.
They felt they had been humiliated and their rights had been violated, for the
mountain was free territory  open to everyone. Behind the masks, they had
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recognized the faces of a number of villagers, whom they then reported to the
police at the district capital of itluk. At a police raid a few days later, several
men were taken from their beds, all of them members of the Jerkovi  clan.
The Jerkovi i were quick to express their great indignation and their con-
tempt. In Croat communities in this part of Herzegovina, it was considered
cowardly to solve a conflict by summoning the police. Up to the war, the
police department was an alien power apparatus, and what is more it was
staffed by Serbs, the sworn enemies of the Croats (Soldo n.d.). By calling in
the police, the Ostoji i had proved to be friends of the enemy, ‘little Serbs’ as
one informant put it.
A few days later, two policemen were attacked and beaten in their homes
in itluk.14  And in the following week, in one night all thirty-two of the Ostoji i’s
taxis were wrecked. The itluk police, summoned once again, did not arrive
in time to catch the perpetrators; approximately forty  men of the Jerkovi
and ivri  clans had disappeared from the village.15
Gangs and Vigilantes: The Emergence of Violence Formations
By now the war in Croatia had drastically expanded and its repercussions
were increasingly felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb communities received
arms from Serbia to be able to defend themselves against ‘the fascist aggres-
sion of the Usta a’, as it was called (Glenny 1 992 ; Silber and Little 1 996; Denitch
1 996). In response, the Croat inhabitants of Bosnia Herzegovina felt threat-
ened and large numbers of them broke into the numerous local munitions
and arms depots of the Territorial Defence, which was soon dismantled as a
result. In no time, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina had turned into one vast constel-
lation of heavily  armed settlements (Rathfelder 1 992). Side by  side with these
local vigilantes, small mobile-armed units developed of Serbs and Croats, who
roamed the countryside independently  or in larger groups, causing trouble
wherever they went and burglarizing the army’s numerous munitions depots.
These units, often referred to as rezervisti, consisted of deserters from the
Croatian front, men evading mobilization, members of secret paramilitary
organizations of either Croats (Usta i ) or Serbs ( etni i ), villagers who lost
their jobs in the now defunct tourist industry  and were on the lookout for
loot, and lastly , as in Medjugorje, people running away  from the police (Hof-
wiler 1 992 ). In addition, the various sections of the former Yugoslav army,
now divided along ethnic lines, also belonged to this extremely dynamic and
complex configuration of attack and defence units, sometimes collaborating
with each other and sometimes fiercely battling. ‘Armies’ of Serbs, Croats or
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Muslims, who barely differed in any way from the rezervisti described above,
operated in the various regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each group tried to
gain control over its own patch of the ethnic quilt.
In Medjugorje, the Ostoji i feared the rapid disintegration of the official
authority  crumbled. These people, whose conduct, ideas and conceptions
were so deviant in the region, were regularly  identified w ith the Serb arch
enemy, and were in danger of becoming the victims of a ‘cleansing’ (ra cistiti
teren). In this predominantly  Croat area, it was not easy  to defend oneself
against this kind of campaign with the help of one’s ‘own’ rezervisti; self-de-
fence and the help of the police were what was needed.
In the course of September 1 991 , the ivri i claimed to have observed some
changes in the Ostoji i hamlet at the foot of the Mountain of the Cross. Every
day a small police patrol from itluk would come by. The police officers would
inspect the streets and fields of the hamlet and then withdraw to the dining
room of one of the boarding houses. The men of the Ostoji i clan were rarely
observed outdoors, and it seemed as if the community solely consisted of
women and children. But in the darkness of the homes and late at night on
the edge of the Mountain of the Cross, behind bushes and trees, attentive
observers regularly noticed men with guns. Judging from their numbers, they
were not just Ostoji i men, and further probing revealed that some of them
were men no one in the district had ever seen before. It was later concluded
from the licence plates on their cars that they were Ostoji i in-laws from a
town across the Neretva River that was known as a non-Croat town.
On the adjacent home grounds of the ivri i, these developments were
warily  observed with suspicion. It was becoming clearer and clearer that the
Ostoji i maintained ties with the etni i and thus belonged to the enemy camp.
Tension rose to a peak when one of the Sivrici boys, said to have been work-
ing on a chimney, was shot tw ice from the direction of the Ostoji i. It gave
him such a scare that he lost his balance, fell off the roof and broke his arm.
The next night explosions were heard from the direction of the church-
yard, and on the following morning the itluk police found all the Ostoji i
graves blown up. The meaning of this act was immediately apparent to every-
one: a denial of the rights of the Ostoji i in the community  and the destruc-
tion of their historical roots. In the past year, this age-old custom had been
regularly  revived on a large scale by Serbs and Croats in the neighbouring
extremely militant Krajina region, and it was always the start of a ‘cleansing’
(Reissmüller 1 992; Rathfelder 1 992).  After this act of open aggression, things
quieted down. But it was a menacing kind of silence, and the Jerkovi i and
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ivri i were waiting with bated breath to see how their opponent would re-
spond.
Cleansing and Resistance
Together with men who had left and were now returning, equipped with
ample arms, munitions and explosives from the depot in apljina, the ivri i
and Jerkovi i prepared to ‘settle matters once and for all’ with the enemy.
They made good use of know-how acquired in the army and the Territorial
Defence. In apljina, some of them had joined the notorious Croatian hos
militia.16  Stepan Jerkovic, a former army officer from Split, became their leader
and the troops were called Stepanov i (Stepan’s men). Stepan, usually called
Stjipe, was backed by  six sub group leaders ( asni i ), who each had a number
of men (vojni i ) under their command.
The first thing they did was barricade the access road at the mountain
pass to the plateau where Medjugorje is situated. Day and night, they would
hide there and guard the road. This made it impossible for their enemy to
receive sizeable reinforcements. Limited help could only arrive via the moun-
tain paths, but there too regular patrols were on duty.
It was not only  outwardly  that Medjugorje began to resemble a strong-
hold, but inwardly as well. All the windows in the homes of both the clans
were blacked out, and wherever possible the lanes were hidden from sight by
lines hung with tobacco leaves, branches or straw mats. Virtually  undetected
by the enemy, it was thus possible to reach each other’s property and gather
in groups inside the walled courtyards.
The Ostoji i were taken completely unawares by the swift transformation
into what resembled a fortress. And when they too wanted to make a safe
place for themselves, they found themselves in the line of fire, though none
of the shots hit the mark. Some of the women and children fled to the Moun-
tain of the Cross, where they were guarded by  clansmen hidden from sight.
It was only  at night, protected by  darkness, that they sometimes ventured to
return home for their clothes and something to eat or drink. But the enemy
was on guard, and responded to their every move with gunfire.
In November 1 991 , the Stepanov i launched their offensive. Their aim was
to destroy the cisterns at the homes of the Ostojici. In only  a few nights, they
managed to blow up or render useless 3 0 of the almost 1 7 0 cisterns. Thirty
families and their livestock had to fetch water elsewhere. From their hiding
places, almost every  day the Stepanov i managed to shoot a few head of cat-
tle on the paths.
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Fear was mushrooming in the Ostoji i camp, for it was evident that the
superior opponent was engaged in a ‘cleansing’. One night early  in Decem-
ber, there was a skirmish between several of the guards and a member of the
Ostoji  clan. After a fracas, the men managed to break away. It was clear to
the Stepanov i that their opponents had gone to fetch reinforcements; there-
fore they intensified their guarding patrols.
To this very day, Stepan’s men still do not know how their opponent managed
to bring in forty men (the size of two paramilitary units) without their noticing
anything. They were soon confronted with these reinforcements — relatives of
the Ostoji i from a village to the south that had been ‘cleansed’ by Serb militia-
men. It was a ferocious confrontation. Firing their rifles as a diversionary measure,
the Ostoji i succeeded in destroying twelve of the ivri i’s cisterns. This made
a large segment of the ivri  clan vulnerable and dependent upon others.
By Christmas 1 991 , Medjugorje’s ‘little war’ took a virtually  inevitable turn.
On the name-day of his deceased wife, Mate Jerkovi , one of the Jerkovi
clan elders, went to her grave to honour her with dried flowers and wild fruit.17
Mate had trouble walking, which was why he went by  mule. As he was pass-
ing the ravaged graves of the Ostoji i, a bullet hit him in the thigh. The bullet
was aimed at the mule and not at a person, or so the Ostoji i later informed
me when I spoke to them in their hiding place. But the flow of human blood
had awakened the spirit of revenge.
Mutual Destruction
Blood revenge as a form of self-help is an old and still fairly  widespread in-
stitution in this corner of ex-Yugoslavia (Bax 1 995 ; A. Djilas 1 991 ; Vego 1 981 ).
In addition to the state, it was mainly  the clergy who — by way of reconcilia-
tion rituals — made every effort to attenuate this way of eliminating one’s op-
ponents. In the course of 1 991 , however, state power crumbled and the clergy-
men of Medjugorje were ‘summoned back’ to their monasteries in Humac
and Siroki Brijeg. This left the parties to their own devices, abandoned to the
dynamics of the devastating process they formed with each other. Once it
had been set in motion, the process exhibited a tendency toward escalation,
driven as it was by  the principle of retribution.
Shortly  after the start of the new year, this was demonstrated for all to see.
The eldest son of Mate, the old man who had been shot on his mule, had
shot one of the Ostoji i clan elders in the thigh as a payback for his father’s
wound. But Mate fell ill and died of his wound. When this happened, his
own clan’s elders all agreed the retribution had to be taken one step further;
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Jure Ostoji , a brother of the clan elder shot in the thigh, was now shot in the
lower back and paralysed for life. His clan refused to accept this and took
double revenge: two young ivri  men were shot in the back, and died on the
day of the Feast of the Epiphany (6 January). Obviously  this bloodshed put
the parties on guard, for since then neither of the clans, at any rate their male
members, dared to show their faces much on the streets in the daytime.
Together with a good two hundred other men, most of whom were from
the Jerkovi  and ivri  clans, the Stepanov i kept the area closed off. This put
the Ostoji i and their relatives from outside the area, more than a hundred
men in all, in a perilous position. Their ammunition and food were running
out, but if they made a mass break for it, it would probably  mean a massacre
of their own people. Waiting longer, however, would only  force them to sur-
render in the end and leave Medjugorje forever.
For a couple of weeks, nothing special happened; the tension rose and
everyone seemed to be waiting for an explosion of violence. It came from an
unexpected quarter. Late one afternoon at the end of January 1 991 , a few
military  aeroplanes from the base in Mostar flew low over Medjugorje. It later
turned out that they were looking for a group of Montenegrin soldiers who
had deserted in East Slavonia and were now headed home, plundering as
they went (Mostarski list, 25  January  1 992). Above Medjugorje, the planes (with
Serb pilots) began to shoot at the church steeples. They missed, but they did
hit a few of the homes of the ivri i. The incident distracted attention from the
dominant clans, and the Ostoji i were quick to take advantage. Together with
some women and children, a group of men managed to reach the pass. Once
they got there, however, they met up with the guards. Fierce fighting ensued,
and the unprotected Ostoji i were clearly at a disadvantage. Quite a few men,
women and children were killed, others managed to escape. Some guards
also perished in the fighting.
Things were quiet again in Medjugorje, so quiet that a group of unsuspect-
ing pilgrims could move about freely for several days in the Marian Peace
Centre.18  At regular intervals they saw groups of people, mainly  women and
children, leave the village with their luggage. When asked about it, they said
they were fleeing ‘the war’. The pilgrims did not witness the movement in
the other direction, the armed men entering the village in the dead of night
and spreading out over the houses. They were the relatives of the battling
clans who had come to the village from ‘liberated’ areas, men who were no
longer needed at home because their villages had been cleansed, and who
had sw orn to avenge all their dead kin.19
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Denouement
The exodus continued until the end of March. Growing numbers of women
and children left, and Medjugorje increasingly  became a stronghold of armed
men.20  A small incident sparked off enormous repercussions. At a courtyard
of the Ostoji i, a few  intoxicated men were showing off their skills as marks-
men by shooting tins and bottles off a wall w ith their little Scorpio rifles. One
of them recklessly  tried it with a grenade gun. The grenade exploded and
blew a big hole in the wall of Ante ivri ’s stable a bit further down the street.
The shot was immediately answered in kind, and mortar shells soon set two
homes ablaze, killing the elderly  tenants.
Hardly a day went by w ithout each of the sides doing some damage to the
other’s property , especially  their livestock, supply sheds and cisterns. But it
was the sharply rising number of avengers inside the gates of Medjugorje
that gave ‘the war’ another turn: personal retribution in the dead of night or
at dawn with a knife and a rope. An estimated eighty  people, almost sixty  of
whom were locals, lost their lives this way ; their mutilated bodies, usually
hanging from a tree or ceiling beam, bore witness to the atrocious acts.21
The complicated process of retribution went on until the end of May, when
the denouement came just as suddenly  as the start. It was linked to military
developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina at large. Flanked by irregular militia, a
unit of the Croatian army was on its way  from apljina to Listica. There a
Serb military unit that wanted to force a passageway  through to the west was
being obstructed by armed groups of Usta i from the region. The Croatian
troops stopped near Medjugorje for the night. When patrols found out about
what was going on there, an hos unit from apljina decided to go off and
rescue their ‘Croat friends’. It was a short surprise attack that resulted, as in-
formants later related, in a complete ‘cleansing’ of the Ostoji i hamlet. Well
nigh a hundred people, mostly  men, were captured and taken off to a ravine
in the vicinity , or so the story  goes, where they were shot and killed.22
At the end of June 1 992 , I was able to see for myself that Medjugorje was
once again accessible for pilgrims. From the coast up to approximately thirty
kilometres past the pilgrimage centre, the area had been ‘purged’ of the ‘Serb
aggressor’. The area had ‘the protection of the Croatian army and its allies’,
as pamphlets at the improvised Customs Office announced. The hustle and
bustle had returned to the devotion centre. Several hundred pilgrims from
Italy , Canada and the United States were being catered to by villagers, who
apologized for the inconvenience and the disarray  ‘the war’ had caused. The
pilgrims were very  understanding, and they were glad that ‘these people could
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live in freedom again’ and that ‘the Message of Peace had triumphed’. Once
again houses were being built and repaired throughout the vicinity, but it did
not seem out of the ordinary, since construction work had been a familiar
sight for years. Singing resounded from the Mountain of the Cross: groups of
pilgrims were praying the stations. Work was also being done on the private
homes in the Ostoji i hamlet — now occupied by  Jerkovi i and ivri i and
their relatives who had come to join them. At the cemetery  of Medjugorje,
concealed behind bushes and trees, part of the ground was left fallow. Only
a year earlier, this had been consecrated earth, the last resting place of a clan
that was part of this district. Now not a single trace of their existence was left.
But somewhere out there, the people of Medjugorje knew, a hatred smoul-
dered that would one day be sparked into flame again.
Conclusion
In the previous pages a process has been described, the final result of which
can be seen as the ethnic homogenization of a local community. This pro-
cess was not the result of a political-military  policy implemented from above.
On the other hand, it makes little sense to maintain, as might be done in social
science circles, that it was the outcome of primitive Balkanism, pointless and
absurd violence, or mental aberrations. On the contrary; its course could be
traced back to clan vendettas and local faction fighting in the context of an
emerging pilgrimage regime and under the circumstances of a crumbling state
monopoly on organized violence.
The Medjugorje case illustrates that the systematic study from below is
crucial to a better understanding of the dynamics and developmental logic of
processes of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in this part of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed,
it must be kept in mind that, rather than being political oppositions, in the
social sciences ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ are interrelated and consequently
supplementary  perspectives on how people live together.
The case study of Medjugorje may  also open options for a more detailed
understanding of the recent war in this part of ex-Yugoslavia. It may indicate
that the bloodshed did not come out of the the blue, nor was it the direct
result of spectres that went back half a century  or so and had mysteriously
come to life again. It may  indicate that it constituted a temporary  intensifica-
tion and expansion of what is essentially  an ongoing process of maintaining
and reproducing extremely passionate antagonism between and sometimes
even within local groups. It can then also become clear that the term ‘war’
(rat) as it is used in Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be taken to mean the
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same thing as in other parts of the world. The generic term  rat not only per-
tains to violent processes between regular armies at the national level, but
also to more private feuds between families and clans as well as all the more
flexible and temporary  violent operations at intermediary levels of social in-
tegration.
The case described above also draws our attention to the fact that ethnic
identities are not always as fixed as our experience in Western Europe sug-
gests. When members of the Ostoji i clan came to Medjugorje in the late
1 7 th century , they were indicated as Serb refugees from a southern area. In
the times that followed, they were converted to Roman Catholicism and later
registered by  the secular authorities as Croats. During the recent war, a Serb
identity  was forced upon them by the other, rivalling clans of Medjugorje
and they were treated accordingly  by  the Croatian army that was passing
through the area. In short, Medjugorje’s problems were not ethnic in origin.
Rather, they were ethnicized in the course of its development.
In his recent study on Kosovo, Ger Duijzings has convincingly argued and
illustrated that ambiguous, double, and multiple ethnic identities are quite
normal phenomena in this part of the Balkans. Rather than being fixed and
static, these socio-cultural categorizations are changeable, flexible and ma-
nipulable; they reflect the results of conflicts, contestations and negotiations
(Duijzings 1 999; see also Sorabji 1 993 , 1 995 ; Denitch 1 994). Thus, the cur-
rent notion of firmly established ethnic identities being the root-cause of the
recent Balkan problems is a simplification and an inadequate representation
of reality , carefully  propagated by  national political leaders and uncritically
adopted by  scientists and journalists from abroad. Here again, then, a nation-
al or central leader perspective seems to dominate in most of Western analy-
ses of Balkan society.
There is one intriguing question that should be addressed here: Why do
Western circles not have a more realistic view of the complexities of the eth-
nically  oriented antagonism in this region of the Balkans? Why do they un-
critically accept the central and national leader perspective? A partial explana-
tion can be sought in the effective concealment strategies of the Communist
regime under Tito. Every effort to draw public attention to ethno-national-
istic differences was relentlessly  suppressed or depicted by  the strictly  cen-
sored Yugoslav state press as ‘manipulation by  capitalist powers’, ‘undermin-
ing activities on the part of subversive elements’ or simply as the work of
‘gangsters’. Virtually  w ithout a word of criticism, Western European intellec-
tual and political circles accepted this version as the truth. Any critical in-
3 3 3Planned Policy or Primitive Balkanism?
ethnos, vol. 65 :3 , 2 000 (pp . 3 1 7 –3 40)
quiry  into the recent past of Yugoslavia was punishable by  a lengthy prison
sentence (Bali  1 992; Kideckel 1 993 ; Ramet 1 984). In addition to Stalinist
communists (Tito’s arch-enemies), the infamous political prison at Goli Otok,
situated near a formerly popular tourist island in the Adriatic, was almost
solely populated by historians, journalists, and authors who had shed some
critical light on the former Yugoslavia’s recent past (Bali  1 992 ; Soldo n.d.).
This Western unawareness was not alleviated by any anthropological or
ethnographic studies at the local level. On the contrary; in their impressive
review article they wrote in 1 983 , Halpern and Kideckel did not mention a
single publication about local-level political relations and processes, for the
simple reason that there were none. The study of ethno-nationalism in Yu-
goslavia was taboo in anthropological circles, and that of ethnicity  long re-
mained confined to ludistic and folkloristic descriptions and analyses of the
cultural content of ethnic identity  (e.g. Hammel 1 969; Lockwood 1 972 , 1 975 ,
1 978 , 1 981 ) or focused on the politically  relatively innocuous inter-state level
(cf. Beck & Cole 1 981 ; Sugar 1 980). Indeed, as late as 1 991 , in anthropologi-
cal circles the phenomenon of ethnonationalism in former Yugoslavia was
dismissed as ‘folk ideology ’ and ‘diaspora fanaticism’ (e.g. imi  1 991 ). It was
not until the recent outburst of large-scale violent warfare that anthropolo-
gists focused on the region became painfully  aw are of their selective atten-
tion and of its consequences for their perception of the locally-based aspects
of the war complex (e.g. Kideckel 1 993 ; Halpern 1 993 ; imi   1 993 ; Denitch
1 991 , 1 993 ; Hayden 1 993 ; Despalatovic 1 993 ; Ballinger 1 994; Bowman 1 994).
The famous historian and sociologist Norbert Elias repeatedly  noted that
social developments are characterized by  a combination of regularity and
randonmness, explainability  and pure chance. On lower levels of integration,
occurrences that might be regular and explainable on a high level become
erratic, unpredictable, and dependent on random circumstances and personal
quirks. Ever since the Middle Ages, the processes of state formation and state
development in Western Europe have exhibited regularity and structure, de-
velopment in a certain direction, and can be analyzed and interpreted as such
(Elias 1 982 ; see also Wilterdink 1 993 ). It is from this perspective, character-
istic of Western Europe, that the developments in former Yugoslavia in gen-
eral and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular are generally  examined and eva-
luated. The case of Medjugorje shows that what might seem random and un-
predictable on a higher societal level demonstrates a large extent of regular-
ity  and explainability  at a local level. The conclusion seems obvious that for
a better understanding of the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina – and possi-
3 3 4
ethnos, vol. 65 :3 , 2 000 (pp . 3 1 7 –3 40)
mart bax
bly for the present problems of violence in Europe in general – attention should
be more systematically devoted to processes and developments at lower lev-
els of social integration.
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Notes
  1 . Mali rat is the term used in the region for small, often local violent operations of
the kind traditionally  endemic to the area: complicated blood revenge, whereby
sometimes whole families are killed or driven away, and surprise attacks or pillaging
raids on neighbouring villages by roaming gangs of armed men or other relatively
small and informal violent groups. According to my informants, mali rat can be
a side effect of organized warfare on a larger scale, but it is not equivalent to  it.
The Second World War and the recent hostilities in Croatia between sections of
the former federal army gave rise to numerous eruptions of local vio lence in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the ‘large’ war broke out between the ‘real’ armies at
Sarajevo and other cities in April 1 992 , it re-activated these local feuds. The small-
scale local wars have become closely  interwoven with the far larger ones, and
they  are part and parcel of each other’s dynamics and raison d’être. Mali rat is
related to a stage of state formation that is characteristic of this part of ex-Yugoslavia,
where the monopoly over the means of organized violence is still ineffectively
founded upon a central plan (cf. also Denitch 1 996; Donia and Fine 1 997 ).
  2 . I cannot provide anything other than rough estimations. The registration records
in itluk were destroyed, which is generally viewed as part of a war strategy
focused upon destroy ing the territorial claims of certain segments of the popula-
tion. The parish of Medjugorje has its own records, but they are said to have
been destroyed as well.
  3 . As to the relation between the shifting spheres of influence on the peripheries of
polities and the occurrence of self-help and local formations of violence, see
Boehm 1 985 . Cf. also Seers et al. 1 979.
 4. The Muslims do not play a role in the story  to be told here.
  5 . Aleksa Djilas (1 991 ) noted that these terms refer to small paramilitary  groups
that were first observed in the early days of Turkish rule.
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  6. During the recent war, the Roman Catholic clergy  from the area, the Franciscan
friars in particular, played a vital role in the organization and mobilization of
violence formations among the rural population of western Herzegovina (cf.
also Sells 1 996). Later, they were also crucial in the repacification process of the
region. Apparently then, the ‘separation between Church and State’, characteristic
of most European countries of today , is still virtually absent in this part of ex-
Yugoslavia (see Bax, forthcoming).
  7 . ‘Mars must be more hospitable than western Herzegovina and it is hard to imagine
anybody wanting to conquer it ...’ (Glenny 1 992:1 5 5 ).
  8 . It was not until the late eighties, after the decline of communism in Yugoslavia,
that hesitant steps were made toward a certain extent of openness about the
reign of the Partizans and the Communists. It is only  with the greatest reticence
that Aleksa Djilas (1 991 ) cited the names of a few authors. Nowadays there are
no longer any traces of candour among the authors in ex-Yugoslavia.
  9. Until recently , Bosnia-Herzegovina was known as the republic with the greatest
firearms density  and the largest military arsenal of all of Yugoslavia. In addition
to numerous arms and munitions plants, there were factories for tanks, various
armoured vehicles, cannons, military aeroplanes and missiles, and there was hardly
a village or town without its own arms and munitions depot (Wiener 1 986). There
were various reasons for this high concentration. After the Second World War,
the Tito administration decided to transfer the military industries along the borders
of Yugoslavia to safer sites further inland. With its dense forests and relatively
inaccessible mountain valleys, the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was viewed
as the appropriate spot for the federal state’s military arsenal. The fact that the area
was rich in coal and mineral deposits promoted the further expansion of the
military  industry. In response to the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia in
1 968 , Tito decided in 1 969 to  organize people’s militia, making it feasible to
mobilize the entire population in wartime. The Teritorialna Odbrana or t.o. (Ter-
ritorial Defence) was set up, which not only  served to support the regular army,
but could also operate completely independently. For this purpose, in almost all
the towns and villages arms and munitions depots were built, which were under
the supervision of local militia and where all the adults, women as well as men,
played a role. Each local community could thus function as a relatively autonomous
paramilitary unit. Although designed to create a unified Yugoslav military  power-
house, the system contained the seeds for a highly complex internal ‘total war’
like the one that engulfed Bosnia and in part Croatia as well. More information
about the Territorial Defence and its problematic relation to the regular federal
army can be found in Mladenovic 1 970; Ramet 1 985 ; Hofwiler 1 992 ; Wiener
1 986; Remington 1 979; Ross Johnson 1 973 ; and Rusinow 1 97 1 .
1 0. Snakes feature in many of the say ings and proverbs of the region, symbolizing
unreliability  and unpredictability. Relations in Herzegovina were often described
to me by  way  of the say ing Ne vjeruj zmiji ni kad bi imala sobje strane rep (Never
trust a snake, not even if it has two tails).
1 1 . I described these changes at great length from various angles in other publications
(cf. Bax 1 989, 1 990, 1 991 , 1 993 , 1 995 ).
1 2 . In 1 990 Zagreb Turist reported that 1 9 per cent of the total turnover in the
country ’s tourist sector was from the devotion centre in Medjugorje.
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1 3 . Elsewhere I describe in detail the historical background of this clan and its ambiguous
ethnic  and socio-religious past. They came to Medjugorje as Serb refugees from
a southern region in the second part of the 1 7 th century. In the first decades of
the 1 9th century , they  were converted to Roman Catholicism, but they  went on
practising some ancient Serbian Orthodox rituals. And after World War ii, they
declared themselves in the censuses as belonging to the Croat narod (nation)
(Bax 1 995 ; see also Vego 1 981 ; Quaestio  1 979).
1 4. Mostarski list, 28  August, 1 992 .
1 5 . At this moment, I was advised also to  leave the village, which I did. As a result,
I could not systematically  observe ‘in the field’ how the ‘little war’ related to the
dynamics of everyday  life in Medjugorje — a subject which deserves systematic
attention, as has been demonstrated in a fascinating way by Price (1 992) and
Povrzanovi  (1 992). What follows is primarily based on long and frequent discussions
with members of the three refugee groups in Germany, and on later observations
and interviews on the spot.
1 6. The hos (Hrvatske Obrambene Snage) is a paramilitary  wing of the extremely
militant and violence-oriented nationalist Party of the Right (Hrvatska Stranka
Prava) formerly led by  S. Paraga. As regards its aims and methods, this party is
similar to the former Usta a movement in the days of World War ii. In the past,
the men of the ivri  and Jerkovi  clans had been members of a gang that covered
the entire Brotnjo area and regularly attacked the (Serbian) government.
1 7 . More information on this custom can be found in Bax 1 991 .
1 8 . Inquiries among the refugees from Medjugorje in Germany revealed that the par-
ties were not in agreement. One party claimed the relative tranquility was promoted
by  the arrival of a group of pilgrims. The other party  maintained that a group of
pilgrims took advantage of the relative tranquility in Medjugorje at the time.
Further investigation made it clear that up to the end of February, a group of
fanatic pilgrims from Canada led by  two of their own priests was in Medjugorje
for more than ten days. When I questioned him over the telephone, a priest in-
formed me that they  had not noticed any traces of warfare in Medjugorje. They
found it quite understandable that there were no priests in the village, and that
uniformed men had blocked their way to the Mountain of the Cross ‘because of
hostilities’. This information reveals something of the difference in perception
between the villagers and the pilgrims.
1 9. They were mainly  men from Croat villages that had been ‘purged’ of Serbs.
There were also a few relatives from East Slavonia, the children or grandchildren
of former Usta a members who emigrated from the region. The vengeful mentality
of these emigrants in their battle against Serbs in East Slavonia – who also come
from Herzegovina — has been disconcertingly  described by  Glenny (1 992 ). (See
also Denitch 1 996.)
20. It was mainly  during this period that the exodus to Germany took place.
21 . The mutilations followed a fixed pattern, with more and more parts of the bodies
being removed. The symbolic dynamics would undoubtedly be an informative
field for further research.
22 . It is said to be the same ravine as where a similarly horrendous mass grave was ef-
fectuated toward the end of World War ii. It is one of many historical sites where
hatred lives on for the suffering that has been inflicted (cf. Bax 1 993 , 1 995 , 1 997 ).
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